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The reason for this Symposium is the upcoming tenth 
anniversary of the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.1  In Daubert, the Supreme Court  resolved the 
division among the courts of appeals2 over the question whether the 
general acceptance standard for the admission of expert opinion 
testimony announced in Frye v. United States3 was applicable despite 
the codification, in 1975, of the Federal Rules of Evidence.4  The 
Court, of course, held that the Federal Rules of Evidence displaced 
the Frye test.  Interpreting Rule 702, the Court said that that Rule 
“assign[s] to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert’s 
testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the 
task at hand.”5 
It is appropriate to keep in mind, however, that there have been 
other significant evidentiary milestones.  On January 15, 1985,  the 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided United States v. 
Downing,6 an opinion by Judge Becker on which Justice Blackmun, in 
Daubert, placed great reliance.7  And on December 5, 1983, the same 
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court of appeals, in In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation,8 
interpreted Rules 702 and 703 as usually favoring the admissibility of 
expert opinion testimony. 
I mention these rather old Third Circuit cases because they serve 
as a good starting point for the discussion of an issue that, perhaps 
reflecting my personal history, is of particular interest to me.  That 
issue is the respective roles of trial courts and appellate courts with 
respect to the admissibility of evidence, and of expert opinion 
evidence in particular. 
In Japanese Electronic Products, the case came before the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals on an appeal from a grant of summary 
judgment in favor of defendants.  Ordinarily, appellate courts 
reviewing a summary judgment or a directed verdict exercise plenary 
review.9  No deference is afforded to the trial court’s ruling.  When, 
however, the summary judgment or directed verdict occurs after a 
trial court makes a preliminary ruling on the admissibility of 
evidence, the scope of appellate review becomes a bit more 
complicated.  Rule 103(a) is the first source of complication.  It 
addresses the scope of appellate review, providing, “Error may not be 
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a 
substantial right of the  party is affected . . . .”  This language suggests 
a sort of “harmless error” approach to evidentiary rulings.  A second 
source of complication is Rule 104, dealing with trial court 
determinations of preliminary questions concerning “the 
qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, 
or the admissibility of evidence . . . .”10  A third source of complication 
is the often-repeated statement in the case law that trial court 
evidentiary rulings are ordinarily reviewed only for abuse of 
discretion.11 
 
 8 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983) rev’d on other grounds, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1983). 
 9 See, e.g., Childers v. Joseph, 842 F.2d 689, 693 (3d Cir. 1988); Equimark 
Commercial Fin. Co. v. C.I.T. Fin. Servs. Corp., 812 F.2d 141, 142 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 10 Rule 104 provides, in part, as follows: 
(a) Questions of admissibility generally.  Preliminary questions 
concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence 
of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by 
the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b).  In making its 
determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those 
with respect to privileges. 
(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact.  When the relevancy of evidence 
depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall 
admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to 
support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition. 
 11 See e.g.,  Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 87 (3d Cir. 1979). 
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No thoughtful jurist would, I suggest, urge that trial courts have 
discretion to grant a summary judgment or a directed verdict, and 
that appellate review of either should therefore be by the deferential 
abuse of discretion standard.  Where, however, a claim or defense in 
a civil case depends upon the admissibility of an expert’s opinion 
testimony, it is quite possible for a trial court to put a finger on the 
scale in making a preliminary evidentiary ruling.  That can happen in 
one of two ways: a ruling admitting the expert’s opinion and making 
it possible for a case to go forward to trial and judgment, or a ruling 
excluding the opinion and thereby terminating the case. 
Before granting summary judgment in Japanese Electronic Products, 
the district court excluded the expert opinions of several economists 
that had been tendered in an offer of proof, as required by Rule 
103(a)(2).  That court recognized that it must make a Rule 104(a) 
factual determination, and held that those opinions were excludable 
under both Rule 702 and Rule 703.  In ruling on the Rule 703 
requirement of reliance on facts or data “of a type reasonably relied 
upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or 
inferences upon the subject,” the district court refused to consider 
the plaintiffs’ experts’ affidavits to the effect that the material they 
relied upon was of a type relied upon by experts in their respective 
fields.12  Similarly, in ruling that Rule 702 was not satisfied, the court  
rejected the opinions because, among other reasons, they were not 
“beyond the jury’s sphere of knowledge.”13 
Since the court of appeals was reviewing a summary judgment, 
the panel was confronted with the question whether these in limine 
evidentiary rulings should receive plenary review, or some more 
deferential standard such as the clearly erroneous standard applied 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), or an abuse of discretion standard.  The 
opinion of the court said, 
In substituting its own opinion as to what constitutes reasonable 
reliance for that of the experts in the relevant fields the trial court 
misinterpreted Rule 703.  The court’s approach involved 
fundamental legal error because, as a matter of law, the district 
court must make a factual inquiry and finding as to what data 
experts in the field find reliable.  There is no discretion to forbear 
from making this inquiry and finding.  Insofar as the district court 
substituted its own views of reasonable reliance for those of the 
experts, therefore, we review for legal error.14 
 
 12 505 F. Supp at 1325-26. 
 13 Id. at 1333-34. 
 14 723 F.2d at 277. 
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In other words, the court of appeals exercised plenary review of the 
trial court’s decision to exclude under Rule 703.  In this respect, 
however, the opinion did not persuade Chief Judge Seitz, a panel 
member whose views were expressed in a footnote: 
Chief Judge Seitz agrees with the result reached by the majority, 
but he believes that our review of the reliance determination 
under Rule 703 is for abuse of discretion rather than for error of 
law.  In his view, improper application of the law is embraced 
within the abuse of discretion standard. . . .15 
Since Chief Judge Seitz agreed that the district court’s Rule 703 
ruling could not stand, it would appear that in his view, abuse of 
discretion review permits rather vigorous scrutiny of a trial court’s 
ruling to admit or exclude expert opinion testimony.  That view is 
confirmed elsewhere in the Japanese Electronic Products opinion, which 
also rejects the district court’s reliance on Rule 702.16  That part of 
the opinion of the court, with which Chief Judge Seitz did not 
expressly disagree, says the following of the Rule 702 issue: 
The court’s role [under Rule 702] is to make the determination 
whether the proffered testimony “will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”  
Undoubtedly the court is clothed by Rule 702 with some degree 
of discretion in determining whether the opinion will be helpful, 
and we normally review only for abuse of discretion.  Knight v. Otis 
Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 87 (3d Cir. 1979).  But that review must 
be more discriminating if we believe that the court’s exercise of 
discretion proceeded under a misapprehension as to the meaning 
of the governing rules.  The court’s misinterpretation of the 
reasonable reliance requirement of Rule 703 is in this respect 
significant.17 
The case of Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., which the court cited as 
authority for the abuse of discretion standard of review, is one of 
numerous cases making such a statement.18  It involved an appeal 
from a directed verdict in a product defect case against an elevator 
manufacturer.  The trial court excluded the opinion evidence of an 
engineer who was prepared to testify that unguarded elevator control 
buttons were a design defect, because the engineer, while familiar 
with other machinery control buttons, had never worked in the 
elevator industry.  While paying lip service to an abuse of discretion 
standard of review, Judge Higginbotham in fact made what amounted 
 
 15 Id. at 277 n.43. 
 16 Id. at 278-79. 
 17 Id. at 278. 
 18 596 F.2d 84, 87 (3d Cir. 1979). 
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to a de novo decision that the expert’s inexperience in the design and 
manufacture of elevators should go to the weight, and not the 
admissibility, of his opinion.19  The trial court in Knight had no 
discretion to exclude an opinion that would have been sufficient to 
prevent a directed verdict, just as the trial court in Japanese Electronic 
Products had no discretion to exclude expert opinions that might be 
sufficient to avoid summary judgment.20  The difference between 
abuse of discretion review and plenary review in these cases is 
imperceptible, as it should be. 
By way of contrast, United States v. Downing arose in a different 
appellate setting: an appeal of a criminal conviction after a verdict 
against the defendant.  The government’s case depended heavily 
upon contested eyewitness identification.  Defense counsel tendered 
the testimony of a  psychologist who would testify to the unreliability 
of eyewitness identification testimony.  The trial court excluded the 
evidence on the authority of Rule 702.  The court of appeals reversed 
the defendant’s conviction and conditionally ordered a new trial.  
Judge Becker wrote, 
Judicial resistance to the introduction of this kind of expert 
testimony is understandable given its innovativeness and the fear 
of trial delay spawned by the spectre of the creation of a cottage 
industry of forensic psychologists.  The logic of Fed. R. Evid. 702 
is inexorable, however, and requires, as the [United States v.] 
Smith, [State v.] Chapple and [People v.] McDonald courts 
recognized, that expert testimony on eyewitness perception and 
memory be admitted at least in some circumstances.  We 
therefore conclude that the district court erred as a matter of law 
when it in effect decided that expert testimony on the subject is 
simply not admissible.21 
“Erred as a matter of law” means, of course, plenary review, at least 
where a trial court categorically rules out a class or category of expert 
opinion testimony as unhelpful to the jury.  But Judge Becker also 
recognized that since a new trial might occur, the trial court would 
still have to decide whether to admit the specific evidence proffered 
by the defendant.22  Thus, the balance of the Downing opinion 
 
 19 Id. at 88. 
 20 The Supreme Court in Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 
574 (1986), did not address the admissibility of the expert opinion evidence.  
Instead, in the first of the trilogy of summary judgment opinions that enlarged the 
power of courts to grant summary judgment, it reversed the court of appeals decision 
that there was sufficient evidence of a predatory pricing conspiracy to go to the jury.  
See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. 
 21 753 F.2d at 1232 (footnote omitted). 
 22 Id. 
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explains how Rule 702 should be applied, an exposition which Justice 
Blackmun found so persuasive in Daubert.  Judge Becker recognized 
that the trial court had never made the “fit” determination required 
by Rule 702,23 or the relevance determination required by Rule 403.  
But having ruled that categorical exclusions were legal errors, he 
went on to say, “The district court’s error will become harmless if on 
remand the district court, in the exercise of its Rule 702 or 403 
discretion, decides that the proffered testimony is not admissible.”24  
Only if the trial court concluded, after an evidentiary hearing 
concerning the proffered expert opinion testimony, that the 
testimony was admissible was a new trial required.25  But a judgment 
reinstating the verdict would be subject to further appellate review.26 
A study of Downing for enlightenment on the scope of review of 
trial court rulings admitting or excluding expert opinion evidence 
leaves one with the distinct impression that scope of review is a truly 
complex problem.  Written by a brilliant and extremely careful jurist, 
the opinion recognizes that some rulings, even in criminal cases, will 
be subjected to plenary review for legal error, while others will be 
subjected only to abuse of discretion or harmless error scrutiny.  
Downing was written in the context in which there is probably the 
greatest institutional interest or pressure to defer to rulings by a court 
of first instance: an appeal after a jury trial in a criminal case.  Yet 
even in that context, the court recognized the necessity for avoiding a 
rule of undue deference. 
Perhaps because Judge Becker’s Downing opinion sent somewhat 
mixed signals on the respective roles of trial and appellate courts in 
the admission of expert opinion testimony, Justice Blackmun in 
Daubert did not address that subject.  Shortly after Daubert was handed 
down, however, Judge Becker had another occasion to deal with 
expert opinion testimony.  The occasion was presented by a trial 
court’s second grant of summary judgment in a massive lawsuit 
growing out of the use of PCB in a rail yard in Paoli, Pennsylvania.27  
In a lengthy opinion dealing with expert witness efforts to link 
exposure to PCB with the plaintiffs’ illnesses, the court discussed 
“Standard of Review” extensively.28  That part of the opinion is worth 
 
 23 Id. at 1242. 
 24 Id. at 1243. 
 25 Id. at 1244. 
 26 Id. at 1244 n.28. 
 27 The first summary judgment was reversed in In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 
F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990) (Paoli I), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 961 (1991). 
 28 In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig. (Paoli II), 35 F.3d 717, 749-50 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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quoting at some length, because it confirms what had by this time 
become obvious.  The scope of review of Rule 702 and Rule 703 
rulings by trial courts is not a simple matter.  Judge Becker wrote, 
A district court’s ruling on admissibility of evidence is reviewed 
for abuse of discretion, “but to the extent the district court’s 
ruling turns on an interpretation of a Federal Rule of Evidence 
our review is plenary.”  DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 944.  The threshold 
rule is, of course, one of deference.  However: 
the justifications for committing decisions to the 
discretion of the court are not uniform, and may vary 
with the specific type of decisions.  Although the 
standard of review in such instances is generally framed 
as “abuse of discretion,” in fact the scope of review will 
be directly related to the reason why that category or 
type of decision is committed to the trial court’s 
discretion in the first instance. 
United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 817 (3d Cir.1981).  In several 
other areas, we have applied a heightened abuse of discretion 
review. . . . 
While evidentiary rulings are generally subject to a particularly 
high level of deference because the trial court has a superior 
vantage point to assess the evidence, see Criden, 648 F.2d at 818, 
evaluating the reliability of scientific methodologies and data does 
not generally involve assessing the truthfulness of the expert 
witnesses and thus is often not significantly more difficult on a 
cold record.  Moreover, here there are factors that counsel in 
favor of a hard look at (more stringent review of) the district 
court’s exercise of discretion.  For example, because the reliability 
standard of Rules 702 and 703 is somewhat amorphous, there is a 
significant risk that district judges will set the threshold too high 
and will in fact force plaintiffs to prove their case twice.  Reducing 
this risk is particularly important because the Federal Rules of 
Evidence display a preference for admissibility.  See Daubert, ___ 
U.S. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2794. 
. . . Moreover, the likelihood of finding an abuse of discretion is 
affected by the importance of the district court’s decision to the 
outcome of the case and the effect it will have on important 
rights.  See Marroquin-Manriquez v. Immigration and Natur. Serv., 699 
F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir.1983) (abuse of discretion will only be 
found in discovery if there has been interference with a 
substantial right or fundamental unfairness at the trial has 
resulted.); cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334, 96 S.Ct. 893, 
902, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (the procedural safeguards required by 
due process increase as the importance of the decision being 
made increases). 
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We acknowledge that there is arguably a tension between the 
substantial deference normally accorded to rulings where the trial 
court has a superior vantage point and the preference for 
admissibility of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  We resolve any 
such tension by holding that when the district court’s 
exclusionary evidentiary rulings with respect to scientific opinion 
testimony will result in a summary or directed judgment, we will 
give them a “hard look” (more stringent review, cf. Brody v. Spang, 
957 F.2d at 1115) to determine if a district court has abused its 
discretion in excluding evidence as unreliable.29 
The point Judge Becker makes is that categorizing an issue as 
reviewable for abuse of discretion is the beginning, not the end, of 
the appellate inquiry.  In matters as complex as the performance of 
the gatekeeping functions imposed by Rules 702 and 703, as 
interpreted in Daubert and Downey, the term abuse of discretion is not 
particularly useful unless it is given content and context.  And surely 
when a trial court’s exclusionary rulings on expert opinion testimony 
result in a summary judgment or a directed verdict, Judge Becker is 
right in insisting that the appellate tribunal should give them a “hard 
look.”  Otherwise, as noted above, a trial court could put its finger on 
the scale and thereby frustrate the exercise of plenary review of such 
summary judgments or directed verdicts by appellate tribunals. 
Indeed, a reasonable case can be made that the evidentiary 
ruling, as part of the record on summary judgment or directed 
verdict, should be subjected to the same plenary review as is applied 
to the rest of the record.  This is my own view.  It is not, I hasten to 
point out, the view of the United States Supreme Court. 
Not long after the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit filed 
Judge Becker’s remarkable exegesis on the proper interpretation of 
Rules 702 and 703 in Paoli II, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit was presented with a case in the same factual and procedural 
posture.30  As in Paoli II, the trial court had granted summary 
judgment after excluding the plaintiff’s expert’s testimony on the 
link between PCB and his cancer.31  A divided court of appeals 
reversed.32  Writing for the majority, Judge Barket addressed scope of 
review as follows: 
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo.  Fane v. 
Edenfield, 945 F.2d 1514, 1516 (11th Cir.1991), aff’d, 507 U.S. 761, 
 
 29 Id. (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). 
 30 Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 78 F.3d 524 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 31 Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 864 F. Supp. 1310, 1327 (N.D. Ga. 1994). 
 32 Joiner, 78 F.3d at 528. 
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113 S.Ct. 1792, 123 L.Ed.2d 543 (1993).  Summary judgment is 
appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact, and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  The 
moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no issue of 
material fact.  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 
2548, 2553-54, 191 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). 
A district court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion.  Ad-Vantage Tel. Directory 
Consultants, Inc. v. GTE Directories Corp., 37 F.3d 1460, 1463 (11th 
Cir.1994).  Because the Federal Rules of Evidence governing 
expert testimony display a preference for admissibility, we apply a 
particularly stringent standard of review to the trial judge’s 
exclusion of expert testimony.  See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, ____, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2794, 125 
L.Ed.2d 469 (1993); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 
717, 750 (3d Cir.1994).  To the extent that the district court’s 
ruling turns on an interpretation of a Federal Rule of Evidence, 
our review is plenary.33 
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit majority endorsed the Paoli II approach to 
scope of review in the exclusion of evidence/summary judgment 
context.  The dissenting judge, although disagreeing with the 
majority’s analysis of the opinion, also endorsed the Paoli II “hard 
look” approach.34  Indeed, the dissenting opinion of Senior Judge 
Smith went further than the majority in pointing out the complexity 
of the issues presented by an exclusionary ruling.35 
The Supreme Court, of course, granted certiorari in the 
Eleventh Circuit case and reversed in General Electric Co. v. Joiner.36  
Although three Justices wrote opinions in Joiner, the entire Court 
agreed that the court of appeals erred in applying an overly stringent 
 
 33 Id. at 529 (some citations omitted). 
 34 Id. at 535. 
 35 The dissenting judge wrote: 
Because understanding the scope of appellate review helps define the 
role of the trial court, I believe we should follow other circuits and 
present a more precise explanation of the standard of review.  See, e.g., 
Cook v. American Steamship Co., 53 F.3d 733, 738 (6th Cir.1995) (Three 
standards in reviewing admissibility of expert opinion: (1) trial court’s 
factfinding is reviewed for clear error; (2) trial court’s ruling whether 
opinion is scientific knowledge is question of law requiring plenary 
review; and (3) trial court’s ruling whether opinion assists the trier of 
fact is reviewed for abuse of discretion); Bradley v. Brown, 42 F.3d 434, 
436-37 (7th Cir.1995) (Plenary review of whether trial court applied 
Daubert framework, but trial court’s findings not disturbed unless 
manifestly erroneous.). 
Id. 
 36 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
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review of the trial court’s ruling to exclude Rule 702 opinion 
evidence.  The standard of review of all evidentiary rulings, according 
to the Court, is pure, simple, unvarnished abuse of discretion.  
Moreover, said Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
We likewise reject respondent’s argument that because the 
granting of summary judgment in this case was “outcome 
determinative,” it should have been subjected to a more searching 
standard of review.  On a motion for summary judgment, 
disputed issues of fact are resolved against the moving party—
here, petitioners.  But the question of admissibility of expert 
testimony is not such an issue of fact, and is reviewable under the 
abuse of discretion standard.37 
There are several remarkable features of the Joiner opinion that 
give one pause.  The first is the authorities on which it relies for the 
proposition that all evidentiary rulings are reviewed only for abuse of 
discretion.  The Court cited four cases,38 all involving rulings made 
during the course of a trial.  Only one of the four, Spring Co. v. Edgar, 
involved the admission of expert opinion evidence, and the denial of 
what would today be called a motion for a directed verdict.  Spring Co. 
v. Edgar does refer to district court discretion to admit or exclude 
evidence,39 although it was decided almost a century before Congress 
codified the Federal Rules of Evidence.  By contrast, the Joiner 
discussion of scope of review does not even mention that admissibility 
of Rule 702 evidence may involve an interpretation of the Rule. 
Although the other three cases cited in Joiner were decided after 
the codification of the Rules, none involved Rule 702.  Old Chief 
concerned a Rule 403 relevancy ruling in which the majority found 
an abuse of discretion in admitting a criminal record rather than 
accepting defendant’s stipulation as to an element of the offense.  
Abel involved the question whether Rules 608 and 610 should be 
construed to limit cross-examination of a fact witness for bias.  The 
Supreme Court held that control of the scope of such cross-
examination is governed by Rules 401 and 403.40  Rainey did 
peripherally touch on opinions, but not Rule 702 opinions.  The 
Court held that a report of investigation, offered as an exception to 
the hearsay rule on the authority of Federal Rules of Evidence 
803(8)(c), was not excludable because it contained an opinion.  Rule 
 
 37 Id. at 142-43. 
 38 Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 174 (1997); Beech Aircraft Corp. v. 
Rainey, 488 U.S. 153 (1988); United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 54 (1984); Spring Co. 
v. Edgar, 99 U.S. 645 (1879). 
 39 99 U.S. 645, 658 (1879). 
 40 469 U.S. at 54. 
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803(8)(c)’s qualification “unless the sources of information or other 
circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness” was the statute’s own 
safeguard against the admission of unreliable evidence.41  Moreover, 
in Rainey, Justice Brennan’s opinion on the Rule 803(8)(c) question 
is quite clearly an example of plenary review of what he identifies as 
an issue of statutory interpretation.  And in making the door-opening 
interpretation of Rule 803(8)(c), Justice Brennan referred to “the 
Federal Rules’ general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers 
to ‘opinion’ testimony.”42  The Court’s discussion of abuse of 
discretion review in Rainey refers to the trial court’s restriction of the 
scope of cross-examination, not to its Rule 803(8)(c) ruling.43 
Finally, the Supreme Court’s Joiner opinion is remarkable for a 
citation it did not include.  There is no reference to Judge Becker’s 
exegesis of Rule 702 in Paoli II, although in Joiner, the Eleventh 
Circuit relied upon it. 
At this point, one may effectively compare what the Supreme 
Court did in Joiner with what it did in Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 
Zenith Radio.44  That case was one of the summary judgment trilogy 
that proclaimed a change in the role of federal courts in passing 
upon motions for summary judgment.45  Instead of discussing the 
Court of Appeals’ reversal of the trial judge’s ruling excluding expert 
opinion testimony of economists, the Supreme Court focused, as 
Professors Friedman, Mueller, and other participants in this 
Symposium suggest courts should, on sufficiency rather than 
admissibility.  Exercising plenary review, the Supreme Court held that 
the entire record, including the expert opinion testimony, was legally 
insufficient to permit a federal antitrust claim to go to the jury. 
The Supreme Court’s vote was five to four.  Furthermore, since 
the court of appeals’ reversal of summary judgment was unanimous, 
seven of the ten Article III judges who looked at the summary 
judgment record voted for the question of sufficiency of evidence to 
go to the jury.  That head count is, however, totally irrelevant.  In a 
hierarchal appellate structure, it is the Supreme Court that has the 
ultimate responsibility for the meaning of federal statutes.  In fact, 
the majority expressed no deference to the trial court or 
intermediate court rulings.  Rather, it quite properly exercised 
 
 41 488 U.S. at 167. 
 42 Id. at 169. 
 43 Id. at 175. 
 44 475 U.S. 574 (1983). 
 45 The other two in the trilogy were Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 
(1986), and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
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plenary review in deciding the legal question of what evidence is 
legally sufficient to go to the jury on a federal antitrust claim.  On 
that legal question, the Justices did not agree. 
The summary judgment trilogy was, I suggest, basically sound.  
The cases are sometimes described as relaxing the standards for 
granting summary judgment.  A more accurate description, I think, is 
that the summary judgment trilogy admonished federal judges, and 
especially appellate judges, to take more seriously their obligation to 
make careful decisions on the legal question, or perhaps the mixed 
question of law and fact,46 of what quantity and quality of proof 
suffices to take a question to the jury.  Certainly, on federal law 
questions, the Court must be right about plenary review of the 
sufficiency of evidence. 
But there is a countervailing consideration.  The hardest cases 
for appellate tribunals are those over which they exercise plenary 
review.  The judges in such cases do not enjoy the luxury of rules of 
deference to the original tribunal.  Matsushita is a paradigm example.  
The summary judgment record was in an appendix of more than 
twenty volumes, occupying over eight feet of shelf space.  In order to 
exercise plenary review over the legal question of sufficiency, the 
judges of the court of appeals and the Justices of the Supreme Court 
were obliged to, and I am sure did, familiarize themselves with that 
enormous quantity of material.  That time-consuming task necessarily 
competed with other cases.  Trial courts mostly have the advantage of 
working on one case at a time.  But because of the pyramidal 
structure of courts, as a case is appealed and goes higher in that 
structure, the judicial time available for any one case contracts 
significantly.  Thus, there are institutional pressures favoring rules on 
scope of review that permit greater deference toward initial decision 
makers. 
In cases such as Matsushita presenting important federal law 
issues, the federal appellate courts ought to resist that institutional 
pressure.  In cases in which the rule of law involved is a state law rule, 
the duty of the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals is, perhaps, 
less certain.  Unless Congress decides to exercise Commerce Clause 
authority over tort law reform, final responsibility for defining the 
standards of sufficiency in, for example, mass tort cases will remain 
with the highest state courts.  That distinction may tend to justify 
both what the Court did in Matsushita and what it did not do in Joiner.  
It may also arguably tend to justify the Supreme Court’s rejection in 
 
 46 Cf. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985) (holding that voluntariness of a 
confession is a mixed question of law and fact requiring plenary review). 
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Joiner of heightened scrutiny of Daubert rulings that result in summary 
judgments or directed verdicts in mass tort cases. 
Maybe.  I am not, however, persuaded by this argument, which I 
made up, because while mass tort cases mostly do not present federal 
substantive law sufficiency questions, they do involve other federal 
interests.  That is so because those cases involve other very important 
federal law questions.  In 1975, when Congress enacted the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, except for questions of privilege, it chose to 
federalize the entire law of evidence applied in the federal trial 
courts, both in federal substantive law cases, and in state substantive 
law cases.47  A policy judgment by the Supreme Court that it would 
leave enforcement of that essentially procedural federal law to the 
courts of appeals, because more significant federal law issues like 
antitrust and the Fourteenth Amendment demanded its attention, 
would, as a matter of self-defense, be understandable.  A policy 
judgment that it would require the more numerous judges of the 
courts of appeals to defer to the discretion of the trial courts, leaving 
the federal law of evidence in an abuse of discretion limbo, is not. 
So, what the Supreme Court did in Joiner does not seem very 
defensible.  What, then, do brief writers and courts of appeals judges 
do about a case that seems so wrong?  That is not an easy question.  
The review system would become anarchic if judges lower down in 
the system failed to acknowledge the superior authority, if not the 
superior wisdom, of those who by the vagaries of the political 
appointive system are above them.  Due respect must be paid.  But 
due respect does not mean reading into a bad opinion all that it might 
mean, and not looking for ambiguities that leave room for 
interpretation.  One can pick out sentences in Joiner that can be 
interpreted as requiring almost total deference to all trial court 
evidentiary rulings.  On the other hand, one can find ambiguity in 
Joiner in the absence of a nuanced definition of abuse of discretion, a 
definition including legal error, procedural irregularity, disregard of 
evidence that should have been considered, and clearly erroneous 
factual determinations.  Any one of these ought to lead to a statement 
that there was an abuse of discretion. 
Ultimately, Rule 702 and Rule 703 require the determination of 
what, in many if not most cases, will be a mixed question of law and 
fact.  The scope of review of such determinations should be at least as 
plenary as is required for summary judgments by Matsushita, Liberty 
Lobby, and Celotex.  Such an approach by the courts of appeals would 
 
 47 See FED. R. EVID. 510.  No Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or Federal Evidence 
Rule has been invalidated under Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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not be anarchic, and might even persuade a majority of the Justices 
that Joiner should at least be restated. 
 
